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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON H. COLLIER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RICK L. FRERICHS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
. NATURE. OF TiiE. CASE 
Case No. 16906 
This personal injury action resulted from a collision 
between vehicles driven by the parties . 
. . RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed. 
. -STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 9, 1976, at approximately 6:45 p.m., a 
vehicle driven by defendant, Rick Frerichs, struck the rear of 
a vehicle driven by plaintiff, Sharon Collier, on Vernal Avenue 
south of Vernal, Utah. (Tr. at 24) It was dark and there were 
no street l~ghts. The ·road was snow packed and slippery. (Tr. 
at 25) However, prior to the accident defendant had no 
difficulty stoppi?g his vehicle at stop signs. (Tr. at 89) 
His vehicle was under control. (Tr. at 85) 
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Just prior to the ·collision, plaintiff's vehicle 
had been stuck in the driveway of her home and her husband 
pulled her out onto Vernal Avenue with his vehicle. The 
plaintiff then proce~ded north towards Vernal. Her husband 
stopped. his vehicle 'in the southbound lane facing south and 
prepared to turn back into the driveway. (Tr. at 38 Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 10}. The headlights of the vehicle being driven by 
plaintiff's husband we·r·e on. (Tr. at 92) 
Rick Freiichs was proceeding north towards Vernal 
when he ~ame upon the vehicle driven by plaintiff's husband. 
He was unable to ob~erve the plaintiff's vehicle to the 
north of Mr. Collier's vehicle until after he had passed Mr. 
Collier because of the glare of Mr. Collier's headlights on 
his windshield. (Tr. at 83) As soon as he observed the 
plaintiff's vehicle he immediately took action to avoid a 
collision. (Tr. at 85) 
The investigating officer estimated that Mrs. 
Collier had been traveling at 10 miles an hour when her 
vehicle was struck and that Mr. Frerichs was traveling at 
approximately 35 miles an hour prior to the collision and 20 
miles an hour on impact. (Tr. at 31) The officer further 
stated that in his opinion the severity of the impact 
between the two vehicles was minimal. (Tr. at 33) 
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. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING TO 
THIS COURT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. . 
Plaintiff appears to assert that defendant was 
negligent as a matter of law and that this case should not 
have been submitted to the jury. (Appellant Brief at 3 and 
-
S) Plaintiff did not except or object to any of the court's 
instructions nor to the failure of the court to give all of 
plaintiff's proposed instructions. (Tr. at 188) Plaintiff 
did not prop.ose an instruction that defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law. 
In addition, instruction No. 6 given by the court, 
stated, in pertinent part: 
* * * 
Failure of the defend3.nt to use ordinary 
and reasonable care in operation of his 
vehicle ... would be negligence. 
Thus, plaintiff cannot now claim as error that the issue of 
defendant's n~gligence ~a~ submitted to the jury, rather 
than ruled on by the ·court as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
did not preserve that issue for appea_l_. · Mal thy vs. Cox 
Constructio·n· Company,- Tnc., · 598 P. Zd 336 (Utah, 1979). 
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P-OINT: ·r I 
THE JURY HAD FACTS BEFORE, IT -SUPPORTING 
ITS VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. 
Inasmuch ·as the jury found the facts in favor of 
the defendant, the ·evidence ·and all reasonable infere.nces 
that may be drawn from the" evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable ·to sustain that verdict. · ·Ba·rlow Up-
·ho"lste'rt ·a·nd ·Furn·iture ·company vs·.· Emmel, 533 P. 2d 900 
(Utah, .1975) and· Ewe1T ·&· so·n; rn·c.· vs·.· SaTt ·Lake City Corp-
~.·- ; .. 
~~ation, 27 U.Zd 188~ 493 P.2d 1283 (1972). This court 
should "review the evidence under the assumption that the 
jury believed .those aspects of it which supported their 
verdict. Bullo'c·k Vs. Ung·r'icht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah, 1975). 
The ·critical facts supporting defendant's ~ersion 
of the accident are as follows: prior to the accident, 
defendant did not have trouble controlling or stopping his 
vehicle. The inference the jury could well have made was 
that the defendant reasonably believed he could stop his 
vehicle safety. However, defendant came upon the vehicle 
driven by plaintiff's husband. This obstacle and the glare 
from its headlights prevented defendant from seeing plaintiff's 
vehicle in time for him to avoid the collision. 
The jury verdict based on these facts was not 
contrary to "common sen·se and exper-ience." 
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POINT III 
THE "LOOK, SEE AND HEED" RULE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE FACTS 'BE.FORE THE COURT. 
Plaintiff relies upon the so called "look, see and 
heed" rule first enunciate.d in_ Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy 
Products· Company, 15 P.2d 309. (Utah, 1932). (Appellant 
Brief at 3 and 4) That rule ·states: 
It is negligence as a matter of law 
for a person to drive an automobile 
upon a travelled highway used by 
vehicles and pedestrians, at such a 
rate of speed that said automobile 
cannot be stopped within the distance 
at which the operator of said car is 
able to see objects upon the highway 
in front of him. · Ke11e·r· vs·. She1ley, 
551 P.2d 513 (Utah 1976). 
This general rule has no aplication where the 
driver of a following vehicle takes action to avoid a vehicle 
in front of him immediately upon seeing that vehicle. 
Maltby at 340. 
In both ·na11ey; ·s·u·p·ra, and Keller, supra, th·e 
driver of the following vehicle should have easily seen the 
vehicle in front of him in time to stop. The Da1ley court 
specifically referred to the lack of any obstruction to the 
view of the driver· of the following vehicle. 15 P. Zd at 
311. The Keller court noted that the area where the accident 
in that case occurred was straight and le~el, the road was 
dry, the weather· was clear and the area was lighted. 551 
P.2d at 514. 
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In both Da1Tey an& Keller, the· driver of the followin 
vehicle failed to see what he· sho.uld have seen if he had been 
paying adequate attention. 
Likewise, plaintiff's reliance on Hen·derson· vs. Meyer: 
533 P. Zd 290 (Utah, 1975) is misplaced since the facts of the 
accident the.re demonstrated that the driver of the following 
vehicle failed to see ·what should have been an obvious danger. 
The accident in that case ·occurred on a clear, dry day at noon, 
the roadway was straight., dry and level and there were no 
obstructions between th~ two vehicles to interfer with the 
vision of the followi~g driver. 
The defendant in th~ present case could not see 
plaintiff's vehicle because of the obstruction created by the 
vehicle being driven by plaintiff's husband and because of 
the glare from his headlights . 
. CONCLUSTON 
After having the advantage of observing the witnesses 
and heari~g their testimony first hand, the jury in this case 
found that defendant was not negligent. The verdict was 
supported by the ~vidence that defendant had reason to believe 
he could stop his vehicle in a safe distance and that the 
obstruction created by the vehicle being driven by plaintiff's 
husband and the·. glare 'from that vehicle's headlights prevented 
the defendant from obs·erving plaintiff's vehicle in time to 
safely stop. 
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Defendant respectfully submits that the judgment on 
the jury verdict should be affir.med. 
DATED this 26th ·day of June, 1980. 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
. C IPMAN 
ney for Defendan -Respondent 
lark Leaming Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby ceitify that I handed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Glen M. 
Richman, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 79 South State 
Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 26th day 
of June, 1980. 
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